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Abstract
The Internet of Things (IoT) is rapidly growing, and
offers many economical and societal potentials and
benefits. Nevertheless, the IoT also introduces new
threats to our Security, Privacy and Safety (SPS). The
existing work on mitigating these SPS threats often
fails to address the fundamental challenges behind the
mitigation measures proposed, and fails to make the
relations between different mitigation measures
explicit. This paper, therefore, offers a conceptual
framework for understanding and approaching the
challenges and obstacles that arise in addressing the
SPS threats of the IoT. This contribution aims to help
policymakers in adopting policies and strategies that
stimulate others to develop, deploy and use IoT
devices, applications and services in secure, privacyfriendly and safe ways.

1. Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT), a network of (smart)
devices, sensors and other objects, is rapidly growing
and increasingly affecting our society. The World
Economic Forum predicts that the IoT will contain 20
to 30 billion objects in 2020 [63], where objects can
range from toothbrushes and lamps to buildings and
roads. The IoT has all kinds of potentials and benefits.
For instance, it can improve health by monitoring
patients’ activity and food consumption patterns [30],
increase productivity by increasing the efficiency of
manufacturing
processes
[60],
and
support
sustainability by saving energy through smart meters
[27].
The IoT, however, also introduces threats to our
Security, Privacy and Safety (SPS). Security threats
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entail cybercrimes such as breaking into, and taking
over IoT devices, and stealing data. Privacy threats
arise because (sensitive) data are used for purposes
other than they were collected for. Safety threats come
with system failures because of dysfunctional IoT
devices. As the IoT expands, the consequences of these
threats, which are mostly not specific to the IoT, will
increase. The fast and ad-hoc growth of IoT products
and services makes it difficult for system designers
(concerning the technical aspects) and policymakers
and legislators (concerning the non-technical aspects)
to foresee and devise mechanisms that guarantee
responsible use and development of IoT systems. Yet,
if IoT threats are not addressed by adequate mitigation
measures, the IoT can inflict major physical, mental
and monetary damages [47].
The IoT consists of different components (software,
hardware, infrastructure), is applied in many different
domains (e.g., healthcare, logistics, agriculture), and
involves multiple stakeholders (e.g., manufacturers,
service providers and consumers). Therefore, in order
to design an integrated set of mitigation measures for
IoT SPS threats, an in-depth analysis of the threats and
their possible countermeasures is needed. The literature
offers several accounts that address the mitigation of
IoT SPS threats, both from a technical and policybased perspective. Most of the works proposing
mitigation measures, however, only provide a list of
measures, but fail to address how these measures are
related to each other and what the obstacles are in
implementing them (e.g., [16][18][28]).
In this paper, we offer a conceptual framework for
understanding and approaching the technological and
non-technological challenges and obstacles that arise in
addressing SPS threats. The non-technological
challenges and measures framed in this contribution
are at a strategic, policymaking and governance level.
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By this, the proposed framework aims at helping
policymakers to adopt policies and strategies that
stimulate others (e.g., service providers, manufacturers,
and consumers) to develop, deploy and use IoT
systems in secure, privacy-friendly and safe ways.
Unlike other works, the conceptual framework
presented in this paper models and captures the
fundamental challenges that impede a successful
deployment of the solutions proposed in the literature,
and points out some solution directions to deal with
these fundamental challenges.
This paper is based on research [8] performed by
the WODC (Dutch abbreviation for Wetenschappelijk
Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum, in English:
Research and Documentation Centre) for the CSR
(Dutch abbreviation for Cyber Security Raad, in
English: Cyber Security Council). The WODC is the
research center of the Dutch Ministry of Security and
Justice, and the CSR is a national advisory body that
provides solicited and unsolicited advice to Dutch
policymakers and legislators on cyber security.
Methods used to perform the research are: literature
review, interviews and round-table discussions with
experts and stakeholders in the Netherlands (for more
detail, see [8]). The work focuses on the situation in
the Netherlands, but we expect that many of the
findings are applicable to other countries as well.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2
provides a more comprehensive discussion of IoT SPS
threats, and (technical) solutions for addressing these
issues. Section 3 discusses related work on policy
measures to mitigate SPS threats. Section 4 introduces
a conceptual framework including four obstacles that
impede addressing SPS threats and solution directions
for overcoming these obstacles. Section provides a
conclusion.

2. Background
This section discusses IoT SPS threats, and
describes important measures that can be taken to
design and deploy IoT systems in secure, privacyfriendly and safe ways. Some of these measures have
critical issues, but those will be discussed in Section 4.
The aim of this section is to provide a general
overview of threats and solutions, and is by no means
an exhaustive list of either of these.
Security threats are caused intentionally (in contrast
to safety issues, which are caused unintentionally), and
can be classified according to the so-called CIA triad:
1) confidentiality, 2) integrity, and 3) availability [59].
First, confidentiality threats involve unauthorized
access to data of IoT systems, possibly leading to the
collection of sensitive data, blackmail or digital
espionage. Second, integrity threats concern

unauthorized adaptation of settings and/or data of IoT
systems, e.g., altering the setting of a pacemaker to
increase someone’s heartrate. Third, availability threats
occur, for example, when a malicious person gains
access to an IoT system by taking over the control of a
self-driving car, demanding ransom to regain access to
one’s system, or taking out IoT networks through a
distributed denial-of-service attack (DDoS attack; note
that IoT objects can be used to carry out such attacks).
IoT systems collect large amounts of (personal)
data, increasing the risk of Privacy threats. These
issues can arise, for instance, when personal data are
used by insurance companies for price discrimination,
or by the police to determine someone’s (risk) profile.
The IoT can also be used by companies and authorities
to continuously monitor people’s behavior, which can
be experienced as a privacy violation, and lead to
behavior change. In addition, data might be used for
other purposes than they were collected for (a so-called
function creep). Data anonymization does not
necessarily provide a solution to the problems
described above, as supposedly anonymous data can
often be de-anonymized by combining different data
sets [47].
Safety threats, as mentioned above, are nonintentional [4]. Similar to security and privacy threats,
safety threats originate from shortcomings in, e.g., the
design, production, deployment, or maintenance of IoT
objects. Other causes of safety issues include failing
infrastructure or (unpredictable) emergent behavior due
to the interaction between different IoT objects.
Finally, IoT objects are not always adequately
provided with software updates, which makes them
more susceptible to security leaks over time.
Above described SPS threats should be considered
during the whole lifecycle of an IoT system (i.e.,
before, during and after deployment). Before
deployment, SPS threats should be accounted for in the
design of IoT systems. This is often referred to as
security, privacy, and safety by design [38]. When used
for collection and storage of (personal) data, IoT
devices can be made SPS-friendly, for instance, by
adding features such as a delete button or an opt-out
option. During and after deployment, it should be made
sure that IoT devices are transparent, accountable and
regularly provided with software updates [23].
During all stages of the product lifecycle, solutions
should be used that are based on best practices, or if
these are not available, on new or innovative practices
that may turn into best practices. An example of such a
practice is to deploy a layered defense strategy against
SPS threats, ranging from user awareness to process
procedures, so that SPS can still be guaranteed even if
one of the layers fails [24]. Furthermore, the
development and use of (international) standards and
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guidelines to cover known issues promote SPS-friendly
IoT systems. This requires public-private and
international collaborations.

3. Related work
There are many survey articles that discuss IoT or
IoT-related issues, and possible measures against them
(e.g., [16][15][18][20][28][44][53][64][65]). Some of
these articles have a different or narrower focus than
the current contribution. Related papers address, for
example, the Internet [64], big data [65], privacy
protection [18], or cyber security [44].
Articles that specifically concern the IoT often have
different aims. In 2015, the Dutch Ministry of
Economic Affairs published a report that focuses on
the technological trends and applications of the IoT
[48]. In the same year, the European Parliament
brought out a research report on the “opportunities and
challenges” of the IoT [20][53], while the Internet
Society published one on its “issues and challenges”
[48]. The British Government Office for Science [28]
and the Dutch CSC [16] both published a report
proposing measures against IoT SPS threats. Although
some of these papers review IoT issues and their
solution directions based on some insightful
taxonomies, they fail to account for the underlying
obstacles, as we do in this contribution.
Some papers bring up obstacles such as lack of
governance, incentives, and knowledge and education
(also see Section 4). For example, Danezis and
colleagues [18] mention these issues in the context of
privacy engineering techniques in the general setting of
ICT systems. However, they do not provide a link
between the aforementioned obstacles in a directive
way indicating an approach to address those
fundamental issues and challenges.

4. Obstacles
Based on our study, we developed a conceptual
framework of addressing IoT threats. Figure 1 provides
a schematic overview of the framework. The top of the
figure (dark gray boxes) shows that IoT SPS threats
(top left) require adopting and developing SPS
mitigation measures (top right), as discussed in Section
2. Below that, the figure shows four fundamental
obstacles (middle dark gray boxes) in realizing and
deploying these measures (IoT complexity, lack of
awareness, lack of incentives, and lack of monitoring
and enforcement), and the corresponding solution
directions to address them (light gray boxes).
The explicated relations among the obstacles in the
figure are the ones that we considered most important,

but they are not the only ones possible. For example,
an increase in complexity may increase the other
obstacles. Facing obstacles (like lack of incentives and
monitoring) properly, often call for new information
needs. Implementation of these needs causes, in turn,
an increase of the technical complexity. The relations
in the figure thus do not necessarily imply causality.
The four obstacles and solution directions will be
discussed in the following subsections. We view
complexity as the main obstacle for taking effective
SPS mitigation measures, involving multiple layers and
reasons and, therefore, it is described in more detail
than the other three obstacles. The first obstacle is
technological of nature, and mainly requires solutions
in the field of software and system engineering. The
other three obstacles are procedural, and require
policy-related solutions.

4.1. IoT Complexity
In this section we explain the reasons behind and
the impact of IoT complexity (Subsection 4.1.1), and
present a number of solution directions to deal with
IoT complexity, particularly from the viewpoint of
addressing its SPS threats (Subsection 4.1.2).
4.1.1. Reasons and impacts. IoT complexity stems
from a number of reasons. First, the basic architecture
of IoT systems is generally divided into four layers: the
perception layer (representing the interaction with the
physical world), the network layer (embodying global
communication among system components), the
middleware layer (enabling management and
processing of sensory data and actuation signals), and
the application layer (representing the provisioning of
IoT services to (end-) users) [3][15][27][38]. With that,
IoT systems have two layers more than traditional ICT
systems: the perception and middleware layers. This is
the main cause of IoT complexity, as these layers
comprise a large number of sensory, actuation and
processing devices with heterogeneous software and
hardware components from many (possibly small and
unknown) manufacturers.
Second, proliferation of IoT devices creates large
amounts of data of various formats, types and
granularities. These (big) data can be processed and
linked to other data sets in order to deliver enriched
information about people and their physical and virtual
environments, often containing (new) personally
identifiable data [31][48][65]. As such, the collection
and use of IoT data may result in many privacy threats.
Usually, IoT data pass through many organizational,
judicial, national and system boundaries, and are
combined with other data sets along the way. The data
subjects, consequently, may not know how their data
Page 2217

Figure 1. Conceptual framework of the obstacles in addressing IoT SPS threats (boxes on left
side), and solution directions to overcome them (boxes on the right side).
are treated and cannot apply their data ownership rights
appropriately. Data recipients and processors, on the
other hand, cannot identify the data subjects and do not
know their preferences about how to treat their data.
Third, a wide range of stakeholders – e.g., citizens,
scholars, entrepreneurs, and civil servants [11] – play a
role in developing, deploying, and using IoT-based
services. As these stakeholders are spread over various
geographical,
governmental,
judicial
and
administrative boundaries, it becomes difficult to
enforce or apply the rules, regulations, interests, and
standards that apply within those boundaries. For
example, those who misuse IoT data cannot easily be
identified and held accountable for their deeds.
IoT complexity makes it more challenging to
realize efficient, scalable and interoperable SPS
mechanisms for IoT than for traditional ITs [66]. We
identified five reasons for that. First, malicious
attackers in IoT have access to a vast number of attack
vectors [49][66], pertaining to the perception and
middleware layers. For example, the middleware layer
introduces a new type of stakeholders acting as service
enabling intermediaries. These parties may become a
source of privacy and security threats by launching

man-in-the-middle attacks or inferring privacysensitive information from collected sensory data.
Second, SPS mitigation mechanisms for traditional
ICTs are often insufficient in IoT settings and therefore
they should be improved before being applied to the
IoT [38]. For example, due to the large volume and
velocity of IoT data, it is ineffective to apply solutions
such as informed consent (as users get overburdened if
they are asked for consent every time that (new) data
are collected), privacy policies (due to increased
complexity of policies when they are specified for IoT
data), and data provenance (due to increased overload
and complexity in marking the origin of the IoT data,
and the processes applied to them). Furthermore,
DDoS attacks (the most common network attacks
especially in IoT settings) cannot be mitigated
effectively by using traditional intrusion detection and
prevention mechanisms [33].
Third, non-comprehensive mitigation mechanisms,
i.e., those that aim at addressing SPS threats within a
limited temporal, spatial or legal scope, may not work
well in IoT settings because different layers of IoT are
melt into one large system integration [33]. Interaction
among such localized mechanisms, with limited
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scopes, may cause undesired emergent behaviors [42].
Thus “security technologies should provide the strong
protection for all levels of system components at all
stages” and system layers, [39, p. 13].
Fourth, similarly, at the governance level it is
ineffective to have small-scale measures, such as
unilateral sanctioning of stakeholders who do not adopt
appropriate SPS measures, or defining narrow
regulations and standardizations for IoT systems. Even
when a (limited) number of countries impose sanctions
on specific IoT products and services, the use and
adoption of such products and services in other
countries may still have adverse impact on the first
group of countries.
Fifth, due to complexity, more trade-offs arise
between, for example, privacy and public security,
privacy and utility, connectivity and disconnectivity. It
is also difficult to seek one-size-fits-all solutions due to
the contextual dependency of IoT systems in terms of
when, where, how or why they are applied. These
contextual conditions dictate the degree of risk
involved and, therefore, SPS solution(s) should be
adopted accordingly.
In summary, dealing with IoT SPS threats is rather
complex. Considering the inherent complexity of the
IoT, system developers and companies may be
reluctant to adopt SPS mitigation measures (e.g., using
security and privacy by design principles).
4.1.2. Solution directions. Realizing SPS by design in
IoT systems requires designing an IoT infrastructure
that is pervasive, interoperable and intelligent by
thoroughly correlating the SPS-related design decisions
with the requirements and characteristics of those IoT
systems [34]. Creating this ubiquity, interoperability,
and smartness is complex and should be realized at all
system levels, such as architecture, protocols, and
algorithms, as will be elaborated upon in the following.
At the architectural level, solution directions such
as 1) Service Oriented Architecture (SOA), 2) web
service architecture, 3) intelligence distribution, 4)
cloud computing, and 5) employing software
development tools are proposed. Firstly, SOA
decomposes “complex and monotonic systems” into
well-defined simpler components, and offers common
interfaces and standard communication protocols
among these components [6]. In recent years, IoT
middleware architectures are often based on the SOAs
[6], offering, among others, a way to deal with
complexity issues. Secondly, web service architectures,
relying on open and royalty free IETF (Internet
Engineering Task Force) standards and best practices,
offer a flexible and interoperable system design that is
proven for traditional web services. Using the web
service architecture for IoT services – or “Web of

Things” as considered in [6] – has been widely viewed
as a promising way to realize flexible and interoperable
IoT systems [67]. Thirdly, intelligence distribution is
another way to cope with IoT complexity issues at the
architectural level. This can be done in two directions.
On the one hand, costly computations, processes and
operations (like data exchange, decision-making and
computation) can be shifted from low power and low
computing capacity IoT devices to resourceful system
components located in access and core networks like
gateways [38] and proxies [6]. On the other hand, some
processing tasks and functions can be shifted from
central components to those at the edge network to
yield improved functionalities like system availability,
fault tolerance, data sharing and management, trust
management, and governance [49]. This so-called edge
intelligence principle can be created by “connected
intranets of things” located in (spatial) areas like
hospitals, stations and households [49]. Fourthly, cloud
computing is a promising approach for distributing
intelligence towards a core network. Moreover, the
cloud can realize some IoT middleware functions like
device interconnection, data processing, and data
storage. Here the cloud offers sensing as a service, as
mentioned in [66] and the references therein. Lastly,
having a set of common toolkits for application
developers can make it easier for them to design and
reprogram IoT devices after deployment [14].
At the protocol level, proposed solution directions
are 1) designing lightweight IoT protocols, 2)
supporting existing SPS protocols, and 3) mapping
new and existing protocols. Communication protocols
for IoT systems should have lower complexity
compared to those devised for traditional IT systems
due to the power and networking limitations of IoT
devices. Designing lightweight IoT protocols, for
example, for key management, access authentication,
and access control, is considered a continuous future
research direction [33]. Additionally, in designing
lightweight IoT protocols one should support existing
security protocols (like IPsec) [49]. In order to have
both new lightweight and old protocols, it is necessary
to map them to each other. This entails mapping
existing standards for internet communications with
low-complexity counterparts designed for IoT
communication over constrained networks. To this
end, a reference protocol architecture is proposed in
[67] to carry out protocol mapping at three layers of
data, application/transport, and network. The proposed
architecture maps three typical de-facto protocols
XML, HTTP, and IPv4 to their IoT counterparts: EXI
(Efficient XML Interchange), CoAP (Constrained
Application Protocol), and 6LoWPAN, respectively.
At the algorithmic level, there are solution
directions proposed such as 1) devising lightweight
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cryptographic
mechanisms,
2)
adding
selforganizational capabilities, and 3) designing adaptive
and context-aware IoT middleware. Security and
privacy solutions often rely on cryptographic methods,
which typically demand a high amount of
communication, processing and/or energy capacity. In
IoT settings, where these resources are scarce, new
solutions are required “to provide a satisfactory level
of security regardless of the scarcity of resources” (like
lightweight symmetric key cryptographic schemes) [6,
p. 16]. For instance, decentralized architectures with
loosely coupled “smart objects” (i.e., autonomous
objects that can sense, process and network) also show
potentials for coping with IoT complexity [36]. In [50],
three types of smart objects are identified, namely:
activity-aware (able to record information about
activities), policy-aware (able to interpret activities
based on some predefined policies), and process-aware
(able to interpret a collection of related activities in
time and space). When smart objects are equipped with
artificial intelligence capabilities, the corresponding
IoT systems can portray self-protection, self-healing,
self-optimization,
self-management
and
selfconfiguration characteristics [41][57][66]. In addition,
such self-organization capabilities can also be
employed in the middleware layer components [34] to
deliver context-aware IoT middleware [66] that copes
with the complexity of connecting billions of IoT
devices. In [6], semantic-oriented IoT visions are
considered as promising for describing, modeling and
reasoning about IoT data. Using well-defined
languages to describe IoT data with adequate metadata
(i.e., in standardized formats, models, and semantic
content descriptions) will enable IoT systems to
support automated reasoning which, in turn, leads to
the successful adoption of such IoT systems [41].
Besides implementing technical solutions, adopting
a collaborative approach is important for having an
effective and sustainable impact on the security of the
IoT ecosystem [35]. To this end, collaboration and
cooperation among IoT stakeholders can take place on
various levels such as smart object [34], policy,
legislation,
standardization,
and
governance
[12][14][49]. Additionally, one should coherently and
cost-effectively validate and test the interoperability
and compatibility of different IoT devices [57].

knowledge of mitigation measures is needed to protect
oneself against cyber threats [52].
4.2.1. Reasons and impacts. The human factor forms
a crucial element in the defense against cyber security.
When information systems become better protected by
technological solutions, attackers shift their attention to
human elements to break into these systems [2]. For
instance, users often use standard passwords [8] or
reuse passwords for multiple services [19], increasing
the risk that attackers gain access to sensitive
information. Another malicious strategy for tapping
into human vulnerability is the use of phishing emails,
which entice users to click on links leading to websites
with malicious software [22]. Both examples show that
human behavior can play an important role in
mitigating cyber security risks and that users are
currently not protecting themselves as much as they
could. This can be explained by a lack of knowledge
and awareness among users. When people are well
informed, on the other hand, they are better capable of
defending themselves against cyber threats [37][53].
Besides users, it is also important that IoT
producers and providers, and policymakers have
knowledge and awareness concerning SPS threats.
With the right knowledge, producers and providers can
develop safe, secure and privacy-friendly IoT systems
[38], and policy-makers can take the measures needed
to support the development of these systems [51].
Currently, however, this knowledge is not always
present. A report on IT projects initiated by the Dutch
government, for example, concludes that there is an
“almost unbridgeable gap” between IT experts and
policymakers [45]. Another report concludes that
policymakers have insufficient awareness and
knowledge of IoT threats [8].
There is an interplay between IoT complexity on
the one hand, and lack of knowledge and awareness on
the other hand. The fast developments and the high
complexity of IoT systems require a continuous update
of knowledge in order to stay well informed. As this is
difficult, the fast developments and high complexity
create a lack of knowledge and awareness. At the same
time, because hardly anyone has an overview of the
latest developments in the whole IoT field, this
knowledge gap impedes dealing with the complexity of
the IoT.

4.2. Lack of knowledge
Dealing with the complexity of the IoT is impeded
by a lack of awareness and knowledge among users,
IoT producers and providers, and policy-makers (see
Figure 1). In order to successfully deal with the SPS
threats of the IoT, awareness of the existence of these
issues is needed in the first place. Subsequently,

4.2.2. Solution directions. There are a couple of
measures that can be taken to overcome the knowledge
gap. First, investments in education can help to
increase knowledge and awareness concerning the IoT
[12][44]. These investments could target primary and
secondary education, and universities, which educate
future generations of IoT users and developers.
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Research should yield insight into the best teaching
practices. The UK, for instance, considers to base
mathematical education in schools on computational
thinking, with a focus on problem solving rather than
making calculations [28], but others advocate other
approaches [12]. Investments should also be made in
the (re-)education of employees that currently work
with, provide or develop IoT systems.
Second, awareness campaigns about cyber security
can increase digital resilience of citizens [20]. Such
campaigns should be accompanied by easily accessible
and clear information to citizens, e.g., in the form of a
website or an online crash course. Campaigns can also
be used to start or foster public debate between
citizens, companies and researches, on the trade-offs
between security and other values.
Last, investments in (scientific) research can help
creating SPS solutions, taking into account that most
users do not have expert knowledge [49]. Many of the
approaches for addressing IoT threats discussed in
Section 2 and the current section originated from or
were inspired by scientific research.

4.3. Lack of incentives
As discussed in Subsection 4.1, the complexity of
the IoT makes it expensive and difficult to devise and
apply appropriate measures against SPS threats. On top
of that, taking such measures often yields little benefits
for the respective party. For example, once a user has
paid for a certain product, the company has little
incentive to keep on investing in security updates for
that product. Additionally, regarding the demand for
increased knowledge and awareness, as discussed in
Subsection 4.2, different parties do not always
immediately experience the benefits of more
knowledge and awareness themselves. In other words,
dealing with IoT complexity and the lack of awareness
and knowledge is impeded by a lack of appropriate
incentives and motivations (see Figure 1).
4.3.1. Reasons and impacts. The lack of incentives to
create or use SPS friendly IoT devices applies to both
users and companies. Users often do not experience
harm when their IoT devices are hacked, and in many
cases, they do not even notice that this happened. For
instance, a smart thermostat does not necessarily loose
its functionality when it becomes part of a botnet.
Moreover, when settings are hidden in a complex
menu, it can be a hassle to adopt SPS measures. Thus,
users often do not feel the need to adjust their behavior
when using IoT devices, or to improve their knowledge
about IoT use, in a way that promotes safety, security
and privacy.

For companies, there are different reasons for the
lack of incentives. First, it is attractive for companies
to be the first to launch a new product, and the
development and implementation of security measures
takes time [62]. Second, once a product is sold, there is
little incentive for companies to provide updates that
ensure security [32]. Developing security updates costs
time and money [44], and can even hinder the
functionality, compatibility and ease of use of the
product [7]. For startups, which introduce many new
IoT products, there are even fewer incentives than for
bigger companies since they have little reputation to
loose [29]. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) could play
an important role in mitigating security risks, but also
for them, the extra costs yield little benefits [5][7].
4.3.2. Solution directions. The lack of incentives to
cope with complexity (by adopting suitable SPS
mitigation measures), and to increase knowledge
applies to both users and companies. For users,
however, it is reasonable to assume that companies sell
sound products. Therefore, measures to generate
incentives should mainly target companies. We will
discuss several of these measures in the following.
First, a measure to generate incentives for
companies is to strengthen the so-called duty of care.
Duty of care refers to someone’s duty to take into
account and act in accordance with the interests of
others [56], which can also involve companies’ duty to
provide secure and privacy-friendly IoT systems.
Current duty of care regulations are not always suitable
to apply to IoT products or services. For instance, it is
unclear what companies’ responsibilities are regarding
the updating of unsafe software on IoT devices.
Current Dutch case law shows that this is judged on a
case-by-case basis [56][62].
Second, accountability based on damage caused by
IoT systems can be an important incentive for
companies to offer safe and secure products [43].
Moreover, solid accountability regulations can provide
the basis for duty of care. Though companies are
currently already accountable for the products they
sell, accountability is often evaded. It is often difficult
(due to IoT complexity) to pinpoint the source of the
problem in malfunctioning software, and thus to
identify who is responsible for that problem. Moreover,
accountability is sometimes circumvented by excluding
it in a product’s terms and conditions [26].
Third, since various parties are involved in the
production of IoT systems, the introduction of supply
chain responsibility can help making IoT systems more
secure [10]. This means that all parties involved in the
supply chain share the responsibility for the end quality
of a product. Parties in a chain can impose rules and
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make demands to each other and, if necessary, hold
each other accountable for possible damage [12].
Fourth, cyber risk insurances can create incentives
for companies, provided that the insurers require
companies to comply with certain security standards
[40]. As the risks of cyber-attacks are growing and the
potential damage of such attacks increases, it becomes
attractive for companies to insure themselves against
such risks. Insurance companies often make use of
security standards to estimate the risk of an attack, and
thus the height of the premium a company has to pay.
This provides an incentive for companies to comply
with higher security standards.
Finally, policymakers can offer incentives to ISPs
to mitigate security risks [5]. As ISPs act as a doorway
to the Internet for many, they are in an advantageous
position to mitigate cyber security risks. Providing
policy-based incentives lowers the costs for ISPs to
take mitigating measures, and it increases the pressure
for them to act. In the Netherlands, for example,
several ISPs collaborate in the Dutch anti-botnet center
AbuseHub [25], which is partially financed by the
Dutch government.

4.4. Lack of monitoring and enforcement
Increasing and creating incentives requires devising
and applying appropriate mechanisms such as
monitoring and enforcement. Lack of monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms impedes the effects of the
incentives described above, as indicated in Figure 1.
4.4.1. Reasons and impacts. Current regulations on
privacy and security in IT are limitedly monitored and
enforced. An example of this is the data breach
notification obligation introduced in the Netherlands as
of January 2016. This obligates companies to report
data leaks and take measures against them. If no
measures are taken, the Dutch data protection authority
can impose fines up to a maximum of €820,000 or 10%
of a company’s year revenue. In the first year, 5,500
data leaks were reported. Some warnings were given,
but no fines were imposed so far. It is estimated that
18,500 data leaks were unreported [46].
In addition, standards only work with effective
monitoring and enforcement. Conformité Européenne
(CE) marking offers an example of this mechanism.
CE is a mandatory marking for certain products sold
within the European Economic Area. The marking
represents the manufacturer’s declaration that the
product meets European requirements on security,
health, environment, etc. Each year, however, several
CE-marked unsafe or unsecure products are withdrawn
from the market, due to insufficient capacity for

monitoring and enforcement [1]. Though CE marking
is not specifically aimed at cyber security or privacy,
the above example demonstrates that a standard alone
does not guarantee the safety or security of a product.
The current duties of care and accountability
regulations are not specific for IoT systems, which can
create uncertainties about their scope. As discussed in
Subsection 4.3, it is unclear what companies’
responsibilities are regarding updating unsecure
software on IoT devices [56][62]. Because of these
ambiguities in duty of care and accountability
regulations, it is harder to effectively monitor and
enforce them.
4.4.2. Solution directions. Adequate monitoring and
enforcement are important conditions for incentives
such as duty of care and accountability. It is also
important for effectuating standards. An obvious
measure to overcome a lack of monitoring and
enforcement is thus to invest in increased capacity at
involved supervision authorities.
Another measure is to improve current duties of
care and accountability regulations. As mentioned
earlier, these regulations are sometimes unclear when
applied to IoT systems. To be effective, duty of care
should become more concrete on what an end-user can
expect from a provider, which may require additional
research. In addition, both duties of care and
accountability regulations should be clear on the
timespan during which they are applicable. This
timespan may vary for different IoT products. A
thermostat, for instance, is seldom replaced, whereas
smart phones are regularly renewed.

5. Conclusion
This paper introduced a conceptual framework for
addressing IoT SPS threats, as shown in Figure 1. The
framework proposes the deployment of SPS by design
to minimize SPS threats, and identifies four obstacles
in realizing this: 1) IoT complexity, 2) lack of
awareness, 3) lack of incentives, and 4) lack of
monitoring and enforcement. The framework also
shows how these obstacles, and solution directions to
overcome them, are related to each other in that
addressing one impacts the other one(s) and vice versa.
The conclusion that can be drawn from this work is
that there is no one-size-fits-all measure to address SPS
threats. Instead, a variety of measures is needed to
create an SPS-friendly IoT.
We have a number of suggestions for future work.
First, the research presented in this paper was
performed in a Dutch context. Additional research
could focus on other countries. Second, the research
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presented in this paper is rather general. Further
research could focus on addressing SPS threats in
specific application domains. Third, research is needed
to investigate the feasibility and effects of different
measures. Fourth, a closer study of the technical
aspects of IoT systems could enhance SPS-by-design
practices. Finally, future research could investigate the
legal implications of adopting legislations concerning
the IoT.
The above recommendations for future work can be
used to improve and specify the conceptual framework
proposed in this paper, thus contributing to the aim of
creating a secure, privacy-friendly and safe IoT.
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